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THE EVOLUTION OF DIVIDEND
REINVESTMENT PLANS: 1968-1988
H. Kent Baker
and
Sue E. Meeks
Introduction
A dividend reinvestment plan (DRP) gives the shareholder the option or
automatically reinvesting dividends in the stock or the issuing corporation.
During the past two decades, DRPs have undergone considerable growth and
change. Today, hundreds of companies offer DRPs with varying reatures.
Although DRPs have received attention in the extant literature. no single
study provides a comprehensive overview of the evolution of DRPs. This
study has three goals: (I) to review the historical development and growth
of DR Ps, (2) to synthesize the academic research on such plans, and (3) to
examine the factors that may affect the future of DRPs.

A Historical View of DRPs
A historical view of dividend reinvestment plans suggests an underlying
lifecycle such as one would expect to see for a product, an industry or,
perhaps, even an individual firm. The DRP lifecyclc divides roughly into three
major stag~s: development and growth (1968 to 1981), the ERTA period (1982
to 1985), and the post-ERTA period (1986 to present). Figure l graphically
depicts this lifecycle by showing the number of companies traded on the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (ASE), which
orrered DRPs from 1972 through I 988. We developed the list of companies
offering DRPs from data provided in Standard & Poor's Outlook and excluded investment companies such as mutual funds.
The era from 1968 through 198 l was one of innovative development and
rapid expansion followed by mature growth. This period saw the introduction of two major types of DRPs, namely market and new issue plans, and
many features including discounts on share purchases, additional cash payments, and split-share participation. Figure l and Table I show that DRPs
of NYSE and ASE firms peaked in 1980 at 759.
The passage of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) ushered
in the: second era, which lasted from 1982 to 1985. During this period, participants in dividend reinvestment plans of qualified utilities received a tax
incentive. Figure l shows the number of exchange listed firms having DRPs
declined during the ERTA era despite the increased attractiveness of qualified plans. Finally, the post-ERTA era beginning in 1986 saw a continued
decline in the number of exchange listed firms with DRPs.
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Figure 1. Dividend Reinvestment Plans
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Setting the Stage
Before the development of DRPs in non financial companies, stockholders
could reinvest their dividends in additional shares of common stock. Yet,
shareholders faced several drawbacks in doing so. For example, the dividends
received were sometimes too small to purchase whole shares of the firm's
stock. Another disadvantage to small s hareholders was the cost of reinvesting. Brokerage commission5 and service fees were highly relative to the
amount of cash dividend5 received. Finally, the act of reinvesting dividends
was inconvenient and required conscious effort by shareholders.
Investors needed a mechanism to di~pel these disadvantages and 10 case
dividend reinvestment. All that was necessary was to adapt the mutual fund
mechanis m of dividend reinvestment to nonfinancial corporations.

Era of [arl} Dc, clopmcnt and Ex pam,ion: 1968-1981
In 1968, Allegheny Power offered the first DRP. which was administered
by what is no,,.. Citibank. This type of plan became knoy, n as a market or
standard plan. Under a market plan, management poob the dividend5 of the
DRP participants 10 buy the corporation's 5tock in the open market and then
distributes these pro rata to the accounts of the DRP participants. AT&T
quickly followed ~uit in 1969 by offering automatic dividend reinvestment
through Citibank's plan. Market plans dominated the ~ccne during the
1968-1981 era of DRPs.
Market plam provide several benefits. For example, DRPs reduce and
sometimes eliminate service fees and brokerage commissions to shareholders.
Automatic reinve,tmcnt abo provides dollar-cost averaging benefits for plan
participants. As DRP, gained popularity, spliMhare participation became
an option, ending the problem of investing in ,, hole shares. The firm does
not receive any direct benefit from this transaction and merely rebalances
the ownership from marginal holders of its shares to the DRP participants.
Yet, firms could receive indirect benefits by attracting additional investors
through increased demand for the firm's ~tock because of reduced costs and
convenience. Abo, thi\ broadened the ownership base of a company, making takemer attempts more diffin1lt.
In 1972, Long hland Lighting Company introduced a second type of DRP,
called the m:\\ i"u(' plan or nc,,.. capital di, idend reinvestment plan (NCORP).
Via an original-issue DRP. the firm sells newly authorized ~hares of common stock 10 DRP participants at a price that is usually an a,eragc of market prices over ~omc interval around the dividend record or payment date.
In doing so, the firm effectively Ooacs an issue of common ~tock ,~ithout
engaging the services of an inveslment banker. Participating shareholders
have their dividends reinvested in new stock that creates nc\\ equity capital
and increases the holdings of participating versus nonparticipating shareholders. This type of plan gained popularity when AT&T introduced its new
issue plan in 1973.
The type of DRP installed by a compa ny may indicate its needs for cash
infusions to finance attractive investment projects without the negative in-
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formation effects of new equity issues. For example, NCDRPs typically appeal to capital and debt intensive industries with high dividend yields such
as utilities. Such plans provide both an economic means of raising new equity capital and a partial solution to a firm's capital expansion problem. By
offering NCDRPs, firms can avoid the costs and paperwork involved in issuing large amounts of new stock on the open market. The u~e of NCDRPs
also reduces the firm's debt / equity ratio, provides funds for investment, and
improves cash nows as the firm may reduce its dividend disbursements.
As an innovator in the DRP field, beginning in 1973, AT&T allowed its
shareholders to participate in a firm-adminhtercd DR P. In firm-administered
plans, shareholder costs are less. Bank-administered DRPs prevailed until
1973. That is, the DRP "as a bank plan used by more than one firm. Firms
sent their reinvested dividends directly to the bani-. which then bought the
corporation•~ stock on the open market with the dividends . The bank distributed the purchased shares to the plan participants' accounts. net of brokerage commissions and service fees.
In 1975, AT&T introduced a 5 percent discount from the market price of
its stock for shareholders participating in its NCDRP. Other companies follm\ed AT&T's lead by offering various discounts ranging from 2 to 10 percent. The typical discount was 5 percent. A few firms also permitted discounts
on shares bought through their DRPs with additional cash contributions.
Some shareholders probably participated in DRPs because of the attractiveness of these discount features. Table I shows that the percentage of ASE
and NYSE firms offering discounts steadily rose among listed firms from
3.2 percent in I 977 to a high of 22.0 percent in 1984.
Several features of DRP retarded their growth. For example, participation in DR Ps limited diversification of shareholders and reduced their liquidity. Shareholders also lost control over the price paid for shares of stock.
Finally, there were custodial problems aswciated "ith record keeping for
the firm and its shareholders.
According to Danneman and Lovejoy ( 1976), the major disadvantage of
DRPs wa~ their tax treatment. Shareholders paid ordinary income taxes on
dividends automatically reinvested. Many shareholders may have hesitated
to participate, preferring instead to receive their dividends in cash for consumption than to reinvest to accumulate capital.

The ERTA Era: 1982-1985
Efforts to introduce legislation for the deferral of tax on dividends reinvested through a DRP began as early as 1974. These efforts intcn~ified with
the formation of the Committee for Capital Formation Through Dividend
Reinvestment (CCF) in 1978. According to Cohn (1987), the CCF began work
on legislation and Representative J .J. Pickle introduced the first bill in April
1978. Senator Nelson introduced a similar bill in August of the same year.
Support increased for these bills both in the legislature and through the media during the period 1978 through 1981.
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As Johnson and Weber ( 1982) note, passage of the Economic Recovery
Act of l 981 (ERTA) allowed the deferral of tax on any quali fied reinvested
dividend made between January 1982 and December 1985. Participants could
exclude tax on up to $750 ($1500 on joint returns) in dividends annually.
ERTA also permitted taxing any gains on the sale of the stock held more
than one year at the lower capital gains rate.
Qualified utilities were the only plans covered under ERTA. As Table I
shows , plans of qualified utilities were about 15 to 16 percent of the total
during the ERT A era. Some qualified firms may have hesitated to start
NCDRPs because of the threat of an ERTA repeal before 1985.
As Boyles and Kramer (1982) note, the benefits of this tax law affected
some, but not all DRPs. This is because ERTA tax relief excluded market
plans, non utilities, and even some utilities. Despite its limited scope, ERT A
may have resulted in ne\\ capital formation, which Wilson ( 1982) sav. as a
benefit to the economy.
Firms not qualifying for the tax-deferred status of ERTA began to see
NCDRPs as a source of new equity capital even without tax benefits. As
Claborn and Owens ( 1984) report, the rate of shareholder participation increased during 1982 to 1985. Thus, there \\as a large increase in the amounr
of new equity capital rai~ed through DRPs . Firms in many industries benefited
from the opportunity 10 raise equity capital inexpensively because a strong
capital position is important to regulators and lenders.
As Table I shows, the number of exchange listed firms offering DRPs
decreased slightly during the tenure of the tax act. This result is somev.hat
puzzling, but it does not imply that tax legislation had a negative impact on
the number of DRPs . As Cohn (1987) notes, many firms adopted DRPs in
1980 (see Figure I and Table I) expecting favorable tax legislation toward
dividend reinvestment.

The Post ERTA Era: 1986 to Prcsmt
The special tax treatment given DRPs by the Economic Recovery Act of
I 98 I ended in December 1985, according to plan. There was little impetu,
to i111roduce further legi,Iation 10 extend the tax deferral 5tatus of qualified
utilities. Following the loss of the tax incentives, firms continued to drop
DRPs. Also, the need for new equity capital had declined ~ince the late 1970s
and early 1980s for some firms. Table I shows that by March 1988 the number of firms offering DRPs had declined to the lowest level in a decade. Yet,
many companies kept their DRPs because the plans still benefited the company and its shareholder,.
Table I also shows that many exchange listed firms dropped the discount
option. One of these firms was AT&T, the firm starti ng the discount feature. The percentage of companies offering a discount on their DRPs has
continued to decline from a high of 22.0 percent in 1984 to 8.8 percent in
March 1988. Dropping the discount feature made DRPs less attractive and
contributed to their decline.

5

The reason that some firms dropped their discount is unclear. If shares
of other firms are close substitutes, competitive fort·es would dictate that
the firm continue to offer the discount or else the price of its shares would
decline. Also, discounts make it difficult for a third party to provide shares
at so low a price. Discounts benefit plan participants but are costly to the firm.
Table I
Dhidend Rcim cstmcnt Plans of NYSE and ASE f irm~: 1972- 1988*

Year

Number of DRP~

NYSF

ASf

Development and Expansion Era
74
I
1972
4
145
1973
1974
271
10
1975
363
18
24
1976
491
517
20
1977
1978
574
19
18
1979
563
36
1980
723
1981
705
30
ERTA Era
1982
704
27
694
:!9
1983
662
24
1984
1985
639
23
Post-ERTA Era
22
1986
589
1987
579
21
1988*** 551
31

Total
75
149
281
381
515
537
593
581
759
735

% Offering ll'o Ab~orbing Qualified

dbcounts

N.A.••
N.A.

N.A.

N.A.
N.A.
3.2
6.8
7.4
11.3
14.8

cost~

utilities

N.A.**
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.

N.A.
N.A.
55.7
64.8

731
723
686
662

18. 7
20.6
22.0
19.3

69.4
70.l
74.J
74.5

611
600
582

I5.9
12.2
8.8

N.A.
N.A.

114
117
I 14
104

(15.611/o)
(16.211'0)
(16.60'0)
(15.7 1110)

N.A.

• Source: Standard & Poor'~ Outlook. Data represent the late\t report on
DRPs for each year. Data on dividend reinve~tment plans are unavailablc from thi~ source before 1972.
•• N.A. = Data are not a\ailable.
••• Data as of March I988.

Research on Dhidend Reinvestment Plan~
Research studies on dividend reinvestment plans fall into two broad groups:

(I) survey research assessing the motives for selli ng up DR Ps, their features,

and managerial attitudes toward DRPs and (2) other empirical research focusing primarily on wealth effects of DRPs.
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S urveys on Dividend Reinvestment P lans
Pettway and Malone (1973) conducted the earliest academic survey on
DRPs. Their sample of S & P 500 firms showed that the primary reason for
starting a DRP was to provide a service for those shareholders who wanted
to save and not use current dividend income for consumption. Only a few
of their sampled financial managers claimed that strong shareholder participation would innuence the firm's dividend payout policy. They also found
that shareholder participation increases with increasing firm size, increasing
price-earnings ratios and declinin g leverage (debt-to-net worth). This latter
relationship implies that pecking order behavior may influence DRP adoption and participation strategies.
In a study of 143 firms, Davey (1976) found that the major advantage for
installing a DRP was shareholder goodwill. Other advantages included raising equity capital, reducing costs, increasing demand for shares and creating a strong stockholder base. Some sponsors believed tax incentives to be
a major factor for future ~uccess of DRPs.
There were two ocher DRP surveys in the late-1970s. Baker and Seippel
(l980A, l980B, 1981) examined market and new issue plans. They found
major difference<; between utilities and nonutilities. For example, the primary
motive for offering DR Ps by utilities, which offered NCDRPs, was to provide a source of equity capital. Nonutilities offered DRPs to promote shareholder goodwill.
Fredman and Nichols ( 1980, 1982) investigated only new issue plans of
utilitit's. The major advantage of new issue plans to utilitie~ was the ability
to raise ne,~ equity capital. They also found that managers felt NCORPs
were a significant part of the answer to the capital shortage problem among
utilities.
Studies by Baker and Seippel and Fredman and Nichols reported inequitable taxation on reinvested dividends as the primary disadvantage of DRPs
to shareholders. The respondents of these surveys also believed participation would increase if the tax laws gave relief to shareholders reinvesting their
dividends through a DRP.
Only one academic survey ha~ examined DRPs since repeal of ERTA. Baker and Johnson ( 1988) studied the responses of 100 utilities and 150 nonutilities offering DRPs. They found shareholder participation rates in DRP~ had
increased markedly since 1979 for both utilities and nonutilities. Between
1979 and 1987, the number of firms with participation rates above 20 percent increased from 6.8 percent to 81.9 percent of the total for the utilities
and from 3.6 percent to 38.9 percent for the nonutilities. Yet, plan features
~uch as discounts did not strongly influence participation rates.
Baker and Johnson noted several other major changes in DRPs since the
late 1970s. First, managers changed their attitudes and perceptions about
DRPs. For example, managers no longer felt pressured to offer DRPs.
Second, nonutilities increased their use of new issue plans, while utilities
decreased their use of this type of plan. Finally, use of the discount feature
declined in popularity among utilities but increased among nonutilities.
7
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Wealth Effects of Dhidend Rcim·estment Plans
A continuing concern about DRPs, especially new issue plans, is their effect on shareholder wealth. Some claim that DRPs force the involuntary transfer of wealth from nonparticipants to participants in the DRP, while others
dispute this claim. Several studie5 tried to measure the effects of DRPs on
shareholder wealth.
One such study, conducted in the mid-1980s by Hansen. Pinkerton and
Keown (1985), dealt specifically with discount reinvestment plans. They theorized no wealth transfer from no nparticipants to DR P participants. Using
a valuation framework to study the discount DRP adoption decision and
wealth effects after making the adoption decision, they concluded that the
use of new issue DRPs had neither a dilutive nor redistributive effect. They
viewed the discount cost as a flotation cost and not a dilutive method.
Peterson, Peter~on and Moore ( 1987} examined a sample of 135 companies adopting new issue DRPs after November 1976 and before January 1983.
The study had three groups: non utilities, utilities adopting NCUR Ps before
May 1981 (before the tax act), and utilities adopting after July 1981 (tax law
in effect). They examined the effect of these adoptions on corporate wealth
through tests of abnormal returns around the initial filing date.
Nonutilities ~howed no market reaction upon filing, while pre-May 1981
(and pre-tax deferral) utilities showed a negative reaction the day after fil.
ing. This reaction coincides with a~ymmetric information pecking order behavior. Utilities whose dividends received preferential tax treatment showed
abnormal returns over a ten-day period after registration that were significantly greater than those not having the tax advantage. The findings about
utilities may reflect tax benefits associated with the tax law of 1981. The results
over the entire sample supported the view that options for cash or stock dividends are valuable.
Finally, Dubofsky and Bierman (1988) examined the market's reaction to
the announcement of a discount DRP using the market adjusted returns
method for event st udies. The results showed a ~ignificant positive reaction
to the announcement. They interpreted their results as consistent with the
hypothesis that firms are moving toward an optimal (less levered) capital
structure. According to Dubofsky and Bierman, investors viewed discount
DRP~ as beneficial. Previous studies found no excess returns. This conflicting finding may result from using different methods to measure the effects.
Also, their small sample size makes such conclusions suspect.

Future of Dividend Reinvestment Plans
What does the future hold for dividend reinvestment plans? Figure I clearly
shows that the number of DRPs offered by exchange listed firms started to
decline in the early 1980s. This decline could stabilize as the number of marginal DRPs diminishes. Future growth in DRPs is unlikely because most firms
have already examined them and reached a decision on their adoption.
Several factors may influence the future of D RPs and the form they will
take. First, the economy may impact both the num be r and type of DR P ,
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market or new issue plan, offered. If the need for capital increases, firms
may either add a new issue plan or switch from a market to new issue plan.
The direction of change in interest rates also may influence DRPs. For example, an alternative to new issue DRPs could be for the firm to raise capital by selling bonds. Thus, both the number and composition of DRPs could
change based on developments within the economy.
Second, the expected condition or the stock market may affect the level
of participation in DRPs. IF the market declines, investors may fear compounding their losses and thus may avoid participating in DRPs. Participation rates could increase with strong stock market performance. Evidence
by Baker and Johnson ( 1988) shows that participation rates increased sharply during the stock market rise or the mid- 1980s.
Third, tax legislation may influence the Future of DRPs . For new issue
DRPs, a broader tax incentive than ERTA could increase participation. The
need for a tax act depends on the amount of external equity needed, which
in turn depends on economic cycles. According to Herbert Cohn (1987), a
new economic cycle will begin in time, requiring new productive facilities
and, therefore, a significant amount of capital to finance these facilities. Further tax legislation would provide both an incentive for shareholders to participate and a vehicle for additional external financing.
Summary and Conclusions

Di vidend reinvestment plans have evolved since 1968. DRPs mushroomed
almost overnight and grew rapidly for slightly over a decade. Growth, expansion and innovation highlighted the early stages in the lifecycle of DRPs.
The introduction of new types of plans and options such as discounts and
absorption of fees broadened benefits or DRPs.
Inequity of the tax law toward reinvested dividends probably curbed early
participation in DR Ps . This disadvantage spurred support for legislation to
rectify the inequity and led to a nC\\ stage in the life of DRPs. The second
era coinciding with the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 la~ted only four
years.
When the ta x benefits provided to qualified utilities ended in 1985, participation rates remained at high levels. Yet, the number of firms offering DRPs
had begun to decline. Many benefits of DRP~ remained after removing the
preferential deferral status, which probably prevented a wholesale exodus
from DRPs .
Since 1980, the number of NYSE and ASE firms offering DRPs has
declined. Many firms are returning to market plans instead of new issue plans
because of reduced needs for new equity capital. Such patterns could shift
depending on movement s in the economy. Present economic conditions and
corporate needs are not conducive for the growth in the number of DRPs.
An increase in investment needs may prompt firms to offer NCDRPs to raise
new equity capital for expansion. If more firms begin offering NCD RPs,
support for a broader tax act similar to ERTA may promote the necessary
legislation. Wide support is improbable in the immediate future beca use of
9

the negative revenue effects of this type of tax legi~lation to the federal
government.
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